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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 02-3745
__________________

ROBERT SAVITSKY
v.

LOUIS MAZZELLA;
ANNE MAZZELLA, h/w
Louis Mazzella,
Appellant
_________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 89-cv-06314)
District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles
________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
DECEMBER 15, 2003
Before: ROTH, MCKEE, AND ROSENN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed April 6, 2004)
_________________
OPINION
_________________

ROTH, Circuit Judge
This matter arises from a civil action pursued in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by Robert Savitsky against Louis Mazzella. The
background facts of this case are well-known to the parties, and we will only briefly
revisit them here. In the 1980s, Mazzella was the sole shareholder of a property and
casualty insurer, Colonial Assurance Company. At that time, Savitsky was an examiner
for the Pennsylvania Insurance Department. Mazzella filed suit against Savitsky,
alleging, inter alia, that Savitsky examined Colonial Assurance Company, engaged in
inappropriate conduct as an examiner, and erred in his report to the Insurance
Commissioner. Mazzella did not prevail in that action. Savitsky then filed this suit
against Mazzella for wrongful use of civil proceedings. Following a jury trial in 1991,
Savitsky obtained a judgment in the amount of $90,000. This Court affirmed the
judgment (C.A. No. 91-1835).
In August, 2002, Savitsky filed a Motion for Supplementary Relief in Aid of
Execution, pursuant to Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3118 of
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.1 In his motion, Savitsky alleged that Mazzella
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Rule 3118, titled “Supplementary Relief in Aid of Execution,” provides:
(a)
On petition of the plaintiff, after notice and hearing, the court in which a
judgment has been entered may, before or after the issuance of a writ of
execution, enter an order against any party or person
(1)
enjoining the negotiation, transfer, assignment or other disposition of
any security, document of title, pawn ticket, instrument, mortgage, or
document representing any property interest of the defendant subject
to execution;
(2)
enjoining the transfer, removal, conveyance, assignment or other
disposition of property of the defendant subject to execution;
(3)
directing the defendant or any other party or person to take such
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is the sole owner of all shares of stock in Colonial Investment Company, a Pennsylvania
corporation, and that the stock was originally possessed by Mazzella, or on his behalf, in
Pennsylvania. Savitsky further alleged his belief that Mazzella has an ownership interest
in other securities and that the securities have been secreted, in part, to avoid execution.
Also, Savitsky alleged that the judgment obtained in 1991 has been registered with the
United States District Courts for the Southern District of Florida, the District of
Connecticut, the Central District of California, the Southern District of New York, the
Southern District of California, and the District of New Jersey.
The District Court granted relief, initially ordering that Mazzella is:
1.

2.

(4)
(5)

(6)

Enjoined from conveying, transferring, liquidating,
encumbering, concealing, or selling any certificated
and uncertified shares of stock, bonds or other
securities in which he has an interest;
Ordered to provide plaintiff’s counsel, within 7 days
hereof a list of the holders identities, quantities and
location of all certificated and uncertified shares of
stock, bonds and other securities in which he has an
interest, the locations of the same and the identities and
capacities of any holders thereof, other than himself;

action as the court may direct to preserve collateral security for
property of the defendant levied upon or attached, or any security
interest levied upon or attached;
directing the disclosure to the sheriff of the whereabouts of property
of the defendant;
directing that property of the defendant which has been removed
from the county or concealed for the purpose of avoiding execution
shall be delivered to the sheriff or made available for execution; and
granting such other relief as may be deemed necessary and
appropriate.
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3.

and
Ordered to deliver to the United States Marshal for this
District within 20 days hereof, with appropriate
endorsement, all said securities in his control or
possession, including but not limited to Colonial
Investment Company, together with a copy of this
order, and said Marshall is directed to accept the same.

Upon Mazzella’s petition to reconsider the order, the District Court held a hearing.2 After
hearing argument by the parties, the District Court orally amended the third paragraph of
the order only, directing Mazzella to surrender to the United States Marshal for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania all property found within the district that is solely owned
by Mazzella. The motion was otherwise denied. Mazzella appeals the District Court’s
orders.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal of an order relating to post-judgment
execution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs., Inc. v. Sharp Props., Inc.,
998 F.2d 145, 149-50 (3d Cir. 1993). Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governs proceedings in aid of execution and directs that such proceedings shall take place
in accordance with the state in which the District Court sits–Pennsylvania, in this
case–except that any federal statute governs to the extent that it is applicable.
Pennsylvania Rule 3118 permits summary proceedings in aid of execution in order to

2

Mazzella’s former counsel withdrew his appearance after Savitsky’s motion was
filed, and present counsel did not enter an appearance until the day of the District Court’s
order. The District Court initially denied Mazzella’s petition for reconsideration, but on
the same date, the District Court ordered a hearing on the petition.
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maintain the status quo as to the judgment debtor’s property, and it is limited to property
solely owned by the judgment debtor. Greater Valley Terminal Corp. v. Goodman,
202 A.2d 89, 92, 94 (Pa. 1964). We review the District Court’s granting of relief in aid of
execution for an abuse of discretion. See Marshall Ruby & Sons v. Delta Mining Co.,
702 A.2d 860,862 (Pa. Super. 1997). We may affirm on any ground supported by the
record. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Mazzella’s arguments focus on the application of Rule 3118; he asserts that the
District Court was bound by the parameters of that rule because Savitsky’s motion
specifically cited that basis for relief. Mazzella contends that the District Court abused its
discretion in granting the relief sought by Savitsky because Rule 3118 is not intended to
be a discovery device (there being other specific state court rules governing discovery in
aid of execution), because Rule 3118 applies only to afford relief regarding property
found within the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania, and because Rule 3118 applies only to
afford relief regarding property solely owned by Mazzella.
We will affirm. First, regarding Mazzella’s argument that the discovery provision
in the order exceeds Rule 3118’s limitations and that the District Court was constrained
by the bounds of Rule 3118, we note that Savitsky’s motion was brought pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69, as well as under Rule 3118. Rule 69 provides, in
part, that “in aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor. . . may obtain
discovery from any person, including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in
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these rules or in the manner provided by the practice of the state in which the district
court is held.” Second, Mazzella’s argument that the District Court abused its discretion
in ordering relief affecting property outside of Pennsylvania, based on Chadwin v.
Krouse, 386 A.2d 33 (Pa. Super. 1978), is unpersuasive. The holding of that case
concerned the erroneous summary compulsion of the judgment debtor to bring property
from outside the state within the state to be delivered to the sheriff or made available for
execution. The District Court’s order, as amended at the hearing on Mazzella’s motion
for reconsideration, is not inconsistent with Chadwin or with Rule 3118’s purpose of
maintaining the status quo regarding a judgment debtor’s property.
Finally, we reject Mazzella’s argument that the District Court abused its discretion
in ordering relief affecting property not solely owned by Mazzella. The case Mazzella
cites in support, Stop 35, Inc. v. Haines, 543 A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. 1988), is
distinguishable on its facts. Stop 35 involved the (improper) use of Rule 3118 by the
judgment creditor of a debtor-husband to adjudicate the title to property once held by the
husband and wife as tenants in the entirety, where the judgment creditor had only a
potential lien against the entireties property based upon the debtor-husband’s contingent
expectancy to survive the wife and gain sole ownership. Based on the record before us,
the situation here is not congruent with that in Stop 35, and we conclude that the District
Court acted within its discretion to structure the order as it did.
We have considered all of Mazzella’s arguments and find them unpersuasive. We

6

conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in this matter. Accordingly,
we will affirm the District Court’s order, as modified at the hearing held on September
24, 2002.
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